INTRODUCTION
One way of approaching the equilibrium selection problem in games that has attracted much attention recently is to model evolution. A common approach is to suppose that a game is played by large populations, one for each player. The shares of the populations playing different strategies varies over time in a payoff-related manner. The vector of shares for each population is modeled as a dynamical system with the growth rates of the shares being related to payoffs, and the limiting behavior of the system is examined. For one such class of dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, it has been shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for pure-strategy equilibria to be asymptotically stable Ž . is that they be strict Samuelson and Zhang, 1992 . This is a strong restriction for extensive-form games, since no equilibrium in which there are information sets not reached in equilibrium can be strict.
But examples have also been given to show that the replicator dynamics Ž . which fall into the above class need not remove weakly dominated Ž . strategies van Damme, 1987; Samuelson and Zhang, 1992; Sethi, 1996 . This paper shows that such situations, far from being rare, are in fact typical. A theorem giving sufficient conditions for stability of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games in regular monotonic selection dynamics is Ž . presented. Here, stability defined below refers to Lyapunov stability, which is weaker than asymptotic stability. 1 The theorem implies that all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of almost all finite extensive-form games are stable. Examples of games to which the theorem applies include the Ž well-known Chain-store Game, and the Ultimatum Game when the possi-. ble divisions are restricted to finitely many values . An extension to some kinds of mixed-strategy equilibria is discussed.
STABILITY

The Model
Consider a finite two-person game in normal form with strategies a , . . . ,a and b , . . . , b available to players 1 and 2, respectively. Exten-
sions to any finite number of players are straightforward, and the two-player case is used for notational convenience only. The game is played by two large populations of players of type 1 and 2. Only pure strategies are played. Let the shares of the populations playing strategies a and b at i j Ž . Ž . time t be denoted by s t and u t , respectively. The payoff to strategy a i j i Ž . for a type-1 player, i, u , is a continuous function of the state of 1 Ž . Ž Ž . Ž .. 2 population 2, u t ' u t , . . . , u t . The payoff to a type-2 player using 1 n 2 Ž . strategy j is the analogous expression s, j , assumed to be continuous 2 in s. Evolutionary pressure exerted by payoff differentials on the popula-1 Stability has received less attention than asymptotic stability because the latter is always Ž robust to small perturbations of the dynamics, unlike the former. See, for example, the . discussion in Weibull, 1995, pp. 214᎐215 . However, recent work has shown that it is not generally true that the addition of payoff-unrelated drift to the model will lead to a stable Ž . equilibrium being ''destabilized. '' See Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson 1995 Ž . tion compositions or state s, u is modeled by supposing that the shares of strategies with higher payoffs grow faster. This is made precise below using Ž . terminology that follows Samuelson and Zhang 1992 . Let f : S n 1 = S n 2 ª R n 1 and g:
is a selection dynamic if it satisfies for all s, u g S = S : f and g are Ž . Ž .
< < where и denotes the Euclidean norm,
The Lipschitz condition ensures that for any initial state, the selection dynamic defines a unique path originating from the state. The other conditions ensure that the shares always add up to one and remain nonnegative. The following regularity condition is also used: A selection Ž . Ž .
exists and is finite, and a symmetric condition holds for g.
Regularity allows the proportional growth rates of the shares to be defined and continuous on the whole of S n 1 = S n 2 , not just its interior. Finally, the key idea that evolution results in strategies with higher payoffs increasing their share at the expense of strategies with lower Ž . payoffs is captured as follows: A regular selection dynamic f, g is Ž .
This says that the proportional growth rate of a strategy with a higher payoff will be greater than that of a strategy with a lower payoff. Note that the replicator dynamic,
Ž .
tion, is a regular monotonic selection dynamic. The description of how play will evolve is now complete. To arrive at a prediction about long-run behavior, one needs a notion of stability of the Ž . Ž . dynamics. A point s*, u* is said to be stable in the dynamics f, g if, for
Stable points therefore have the property that paths starting close to them do not drift away from them. Ž . A point s*, u* is asymptotically stable if it is stable and there exists a Ž . neighborhood U of s*, u* such that every path starting in U converges to Ž . s*, u* . By definition, asymptotic stability implies stability.
Sufficient Conditions
In looking for stable states of regular monotonic selection dynamics one can confine attention to Nash equilibria since all stable states are Nash Ž . equilibria Samuelson and Zhang, 1992 . It is well known that strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable in dynamics of the type described here.
Ž . In fact, Samuelson and Zhang 1992 have shown that a necessary condition for pure-strategy equilibria to be asymptotically stable in regular monotonic selection dynamics is that they be strict. But in extensive-form games, strictness of equilibria is the exception, not the rule. Given a pure-strategy equilibrium, the payoff to a strategy that differs from the equilibrium strategy only at information sets that are never reached in equilibrium must be equal to the payoff to the equilibrium strategy. In such games, asymptotic stability may be too restrictive as a solution concept.
The following result provides conditions under which pure-strategy equilibria that are not strict satisfy the weaker requirement of stability. These conditions are quite weak. In fact, all the pure-strategy Nash Ž equilibria in almost all finite extensive-form games satisfy them see . Corollary 2 . ''Almost all'' or ''generic'' is defined as follows: Take a game and consider the class of games with the same game tree but with possibly different payoff vectors at the terminal nodes. One can identify each game in this class with the vector of payoff vectors at its terminal nodes and, thus, the class itself with a Euclidean space. A property holds for almost all games if, for each class, the subset of games for which it holds is open and dense in the corresponding Euclidean space.
Before stating the theorem, some further notation is introduced: e 1 will i denote the vector in S n 1 that has a 1 in the ith place and zeros elsewhere and e 2 will denote the vector in S n 2 that has a 1 in the jth place and zeros j elsewhere. Ž . Ž . the following inequalities hold:
Proof. Let f, g be a regular, monotonic selection dynamic on S = S n 2 . It will be convenient to define
Ž . We will refer to strategies satisfying 9 and 11 , that is, a through a Note that the proportional growth rates of s , s , u , and u are weighted averages of the proportional growth rates of the shares of corresponding type-c and type-d strategies.
Let U be a neighborhood of e , e in S = S . We will find a 1 1 neighborhood V : U of this point such that no path starting in V ever leaves V. Ž . Ž . By continuity of the payoffs and 9 ᎐ 12 , there exists a closed neighbor-Ž 1 2 . hood N of e , e , N : X, U in which s F s , u F u , and
We will proceed as follows: The assumptions on the payoff structure, together with monotonicity guarantee that the shares of the equilibrium strategies do not fall when type-d strategies are not present. Monotonicity and the other properties of the selection dynamic will be used to show that Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . s qs r yu and u q u r ys are bounded above in N. Thesė˙˙˙˙ċ ,
Using the continuity of the proportional growth rates which . follows from regularity and the fact that N is closed and bounded, we get
We now make the following claim: claim.
Ž . We note for future reference that 17 implies that
Ž . Now 17 also implies g ru -y within N for some ) 0. Hence,
The second inequality above is obtained as follows: within N,
Putting this together with 21 we get Ž . The conditions 13 and 14 of Theorem 1 are not necessary for stability as the following example shows.
3 The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where both players play their first strategy in the bimatrix normal-form game 1, 1 1, 1 1, 2 2, 1 Ž . is stable in the replicator dynamic this is easily checked , but does not Ž . satisfy 13 in the hypotheses of the theorem. COROLLARY 2. All the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of almost all finite extensi¨e-form games are stable in e¨ery regular monotonic selection dynamic.
Proof. In almost all finite extensive-form games, the vector of payoff vectors has distinct elements. Consider any pure-strategy equilibrium in such a game. Strategies that involve deviations from the equilibrium path, when everyone is playing the equilibrium strategies, must yield strictly lower payoffs. These are type-d strategies in the terminology of the theorem. All other strategies that deviate from the equilibrium yield payoffs equal to the equilibrium payoffs; hence, they are type-c strategies Ž Ž . Ž . that is, they satisfy conditions 9 and 11 . In fact, the payoff to a type-c strategy against any type-c strategy in the opposing population equals the Ž . Ž . equilibrium payoff. So type-c strategies satisfy conditions 13 and 14 with equality. Now we can apply the theorem to conclude that the equilibrium is stable. B
Ž .
Ž . In extensive-form games that are not generic, conditions 13 and 14 from the hypotheses of Theorem 1 may not hold, and so Nash equilibria may not be stable, as the following example shows. In Fig. 1 , the game shown has a nongeneric extensive form. In every neighborhood of the Ž . equilibrium T, L , the payoffs to the other strategies are strictly higher than the payoffs to T and L at all points which place positive probability Ž . Ž . on D and R. So 13 and 14 from the hypotheses of the theorem do not Ž . hold. Clearly, T, L is unstable in regular monotonic selection dynamics.
An argument similar to that in Theorem 1 can be made to show that in almost all finite extensive-form games, each pure-strategy equilibrium has a neighborhood in the subspace of shares of type-c strategies that consists of stable points. More precisely, Notice that,
Let f, g be a regular monotonic selection dynamic on S = S . It will ÄŽ . 4 be shown that the set N ' s, u g N : s s 0 s u consists of points which is impossible if U is chosen small enough.
